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THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF OBSCURANTS
History and the Future
Thomas J. Culora
Throughout history, smoke has been used in various forms to obscure navalforces at sea. During prominent naval battles in the twentieth century, from
Jutland inWorldWar I to the U.S. Navy’s clash with imperial Japanese forces off
Leyte in 1944, smoke literally contributed to “the fog of war” and added to the
complexity and confusion of battle.1 But is there a role for smoke or other
obscurants at sea in the radar-saturated, cyber-linked maritime environment of
the twenty-first century? And what, if any, are the strategic implications of
obscurants? This article will explore the latter question, leaving the tactical and
operational opportunities of “making smoke” for separate inquiry.
The application of obscurants on the modern battlefield has been widely
examined by U.S. Army strategists and operators for over a decade and a
half;2 obscurants are firmly imbedded in U.S. Army doctrine.3 Moreover, the
effectiveness of obscurants against a panoply of
terminal homing systems, from the visual to the
millimeter-wave spectrum, is proven. In simple terms,
the particles suspended in the medium of smoke can
be adjusted in size to absorb and diffuse radar waves
emanating from the seeker heads of incoming
antiship missiles, thereby denying any homing in-
formation to the missile. In the modern naval battle
space, where antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are a
principal threat, adapting obscurant systems and de-
veloping tactics and operational schemes for their use
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at sea is prudent. Given the stark potential of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
this adaptation may be essential.4
The challenge, then, for naval strategists, operators, and acquisition profes-
sionals is to “navalize” obscurants for use at sea, either developing new systems
or adapting existing ones. One such system that appears primed for adaptation
is the U.S. Army’s M56E1 Coyote smoke-generating system. The Coyote spews
out large, radar-absorbing, carbon-fiber clouds that can prevent a radar-guided
ASCM from detecting its target, thereby neutralizing the missile’s terminal
homing capability.5 It is an attractive system, since the cost of generating a single
obscurant cloud covering several square nautical miles is in the tens of thou-
sands of dollars. Also, depending on environmental conditions present, the Coy-
ote’s cloud can be quite persistent. Effective in virtually the entire spectrum,
such millimeter-wave obscurants show great promise in thwarting the terminal
radar seekers in many modern ASCMs.
The fundamental assumption underpinning this article is that regardless of
which system is acquired, thoughtful obscurant employment will significantly
reduce the risk to surface ships from missile strikes. With this in mind, there are
four key areas where obscurants have strategic implications: strategic competi-
tion, influence and balancing, deterrence, and escalation control.
STRATEGIC COMPETITION
Obscurants represent a relatively low-cost augmentation to current missile de-
fense strategies and have the potential to tip the cost-exchange ratio, which now
favors the offense, back to the defense.
Calculating the exact unit cost of offensive and defensive missiles is a chal-
lenge due to the multitude of direct and associated costs of bringing a missile
system on line. It becomes even more problematic when researching the cost of
missile programs in countries with opaque accountability laws and public infor-
mation standards. But the approximate, relative cost differences between offen-
sive and defensive missiles are sufficiently large enough to give a clear advantage
to the offense. For example, a comparison of the Navy’s primary defensive mis-
sile, the SM-2, against the service’s own ASCM, the AGM-84 Harpoon, reveals a
cost ratio of $2,560,000 to $474,000—an advantage to the offense of five to one.6
A “shoot doctrine” that takes into account a defensive probability of kill of any-
thing less than one (i.e., Pk < 1) requires, at a minimum, two defensive missiles
for every one incoming offensive missile, raising the cost ratio to almost eleven
to one, with a resultant cost disadvantage to the defense of $4,600,000 per
exchange.
Full comprehension of the “game changing” potential of the Chinese DF-21
ASBM and its impact on operations is slowly emerging among strategists and
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planners. Applying this analysis to the emerging threat posed by antiship ballis-
tic missiles yields somewhat different results. While it is problematic to estimate
accurately the cost of the DF-21, sources place the unit price, in U.S. currency,
between $5,000,000 and $10,500,000 per missile.7 This seems a reasonable esti-
mate in light of the cost of a similar weapon, the U.S. Pershing II, which adjusted
for inflation would be roughly twelve million dollars per missile. In comparison,
the ballistic-missile-defense-capable SM-3 costs roughly ten million dollars per
missile. At first blush, the nearly equal prices of interceptor (SM-3) and ASBM
(DF-21) suggest near parity in cost ratio, but a “shoot two to kill one” doctrine
means a differential of nearly ten million dollars per exchange. However, even
this is misleading, as the launch platform—essentially a big truck—of the DF-21
is far less expensive than that of the SM-3, a warship. This estimate also ignores
the operational and developmental challenges of intercepting an ASBM; nor
does it fold in the things like purchasing power disparity, labor costs, and gov-
ernment controls, which all favor China. Nonetheless, this simple cost compari-
son is striking.
The strategic challenge, then, is to reverse this disparity and tip the cost back
in favor of the defense. The application of obscurants can help with this in two
very significant ways. First, developing and deploying a navalized obscurant ca-
pability would be—especially if based on the M56E1—inexpensive in compari-
son to defensive missile systems. The entire mission package for the Coyote costs
from $130,000 to $150,000 per unit; the expendable obscurant boxes cost about
a thousand dollars per thirty-pound box, each capable of generating four min-
utes of radar-absorbing smoke. Place these mission packages on the Littoral
Combat Ship, on an SH-60 helicopter, or even on an unmanned aerial vehicle,
and for relatively little money both naval and merchant surface vessels can be
obscured from radar-homing ASCMs and ASBMs. Admittedly, for this to work
effectively, more testing and experimentation must be done; in any case, obscu-
rants in themselves represent not a panacea but part of a layered passive defense.
But in light of the challenging operational issues involved with intercepting
ASBMs, obscurants merit increased consideration.
As with any new system, there will be additional costs to ensure that other
shipboard and aviation systems will not be adversely impacted by the use of
smoke and millimeter-wave fibers. Also, resources would be needed to develop
operational and tactical doctrine and procedures to employ this capability effec-
tively. That said, it is hard to imagine that the combined unit cost per obscurant
system plus the very low expendable costs of making the smoke, even coupled
with any additional developmental and compatibility costs, would approach
anything near the two billion dollars spent on the SM-2/SM-6 program.
C U L O R A 7 5
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A rational approach is to couple obscurant systems with current shipboard
passive and active defensive capabilities. The blanket coverage afforded by
obscurant systems would reduce the burden on defensive missile systems to in-
tercept every incoming missile. This would reduce the cost per kill of incoming
offensive missiles to a level that shifts overall costs in favor of the defense. An en-
dogenous strategic effect of this coupling would be an increase in capacity for
theater ballistic missile defense, as missiles and their launch tubes that would
otherwise be used for ship defense would be freed to intercept ballistic missiles
threatening targets ashore. Admittedly, that would not reduce the overall,
programwide costs of developing effective theater missile defenses, but it clearly
would lessen the cost of protecting the “protectors” in a missile exchange.
Second, employment of a relatively low-cost obscurant system would prompt
potential opponents to reexamine and adapt their current missile systems to en-
sure effectiveness in an obscurant-laden environment, thereby driving up the
real unit cost per offensive missile. This too begins to tip the cost differential
back in favor of the defense. Moreover, even if the technical and physics chal-
lenges of getting infrared and millimeter-wave homing systems to “see through”
obscurants are surmounted, it will have taken several years to do so. Potential
adversaries would therefore have to reexamine and reengineer current systems
and delay the introduction of future systems to ensure their effectiveness to re-
duce the risk of failure—which in itself would contribute to deterrence in the
short run.
It is important to appreciate the strategic disaster that would ensue if even
one antiship missile were to make it through. Here the strike of one $500,000
ASCM or twelve-million-dollar ASBM would result in hundreds of millions of
dollars in damage and significant loss of personnel. While a missile strike against
a relatively hard target like an aircraft carrier might not sink that ship, the de-
struction of multimillion-dollar aircraft parked on the flight deck by dispersed
munitions would instantaneously and drastically tip the cost-ratio exchange in
favor of the offense.8
When applying the logic used in both of the cases outlined above, an underly-
ing element should be understood. That is, current antiaccess strategies are based
on using relatively low-cost weaponry to counter high-cost expeditionary assets.
In this case, obscurants would need to be significantly less expensive to develop
and deploy than the missiles they are designed to counter to have any strategic im-
pact. That said, employing an asymmetric obscurant strategy provides a signifi-
cant amount of “headroom” to develop new, more effective kinetic or other
passive systems or to adapt current weapons continuously. Offsetting this concern
somewhat is that meeting symmetrically a sizable U.S. naval force would be im-
practical and costly enough to force nations to adopt an asymmetrical strategy.
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Nations may have no other option but to expend resources to ensure this asym-
metrical strategy is credible and effective. Thus low-cost obscurant systems that
make it more complicated and costly for a potential adversary to operationalize
his strategy affect the strategic competition.
In Beijing all of these factors are well understood. The Chinese have based
their entire antiaccess strategy on developing systems that are less expensive to
produce and operate than the U.S. expeditionary forces they are designed to
counter. Moreover, a considerable number of these systems are specifically de-
signed to counter the most potent persistent striking force possessed by the U.S.
Navy—the aircraft carrier. The introduction of fully operational obscurant sys-
tems, coupled with well-thought-out operational schemes, will start to flip this
asymmetry around.
INFLUENCE AND BALANCING
The leitmotif of arms sales is that nations who sell arms gain influence with na-
tions purchasing those weapons. The extent to which this is broadly true is be-
yond the scope of this article, but it is reasonable to assume that besides the
tangible benefit of generating capital, some positive relationship will emerge
from the arms transaction and some influence will be garnered. For this argu-
ment it is sufficient to note that for a country to gain any influence with another
from the sale of arms, two conditions must exist. First, the system or capability
being sold must produce some military effect relevant for the receiving country;
second, the system must actually work, or be perceived to work, as advertised.
Thus it can be anticipated that for any reduction in either the desirability or effi-
cacy of a given system, there would be some reduction in influence.
Granted, countries often provide a number of different weapons systems and
capabilities to client states in order to foster influence, and the impact of degra-
dation in the performance of one of them may be limited. But in the case of ob-
scurants, which would render significantly less effective an entire class of
antiship weapons, the implications for the delivering state cannot be ignored.
This is not just diminishing the role of an ancillary system but muting what is
perhaps the most prominent class of modern antiship weapons, the radar-
homing missile.
The implication for the United States is that delivering low-cost, low-tech
obscurant systems capable of providing significant protection for surface ships
may produce some increase in influence for Washington. (The effect would
likely be marginal, as obscurants are easily produced indigenously.) More signif-
icantly, whether through transfer or internal development, wide distribution of
obscurant systems would blunt the potent military capability of any aggressor
C U L O R A 7 7
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country whose advantage rests with its ability to coerce or pressure its neighbors
through use of radar-guided missiles aimed at ships at sea.
In 2009 China extended its global influence through a variety of means, in-
cluding raising its profile in international arms sales.9 For example, the Chinese
recently delivered a Type 53H3 Sword-class frigate, PNS Zulfiquar, to Pakistan,
replete with eight C-802/CSS-N-8 antiship cruise missiles. This transfer in itself
represents only a marginal operational increase for the Pakistani navy, as the
four Type 53H3s involved replace six older, ex-British Amazon-class frigates
scheduled to leave the fleet in the next decade. However, the arrival of Zulfiquar
“marks the first time in Pakistan’s history in which it has received a new-build
major frontline warship.”10 An underlying strategic goal here for China is to
strengthen its influence with Pakistan to ensure that the relationship of the
United States with Islamabad does not go unchecked.
But perhaps as important, this sale affects China’s other strategic rival in the
region, India. The Indian Navy must acknowledge the increased capability the
arrival of these Type 53H3s and their C-802s represents by obtaining more plat-
forms or more capable systems, thereby exacerbating an already tense regional
arms race. Should the DF-21’s constituent technologies migrate to Pakistan or to
other countries in the region, that too would exacerbate regional competition.
Any country, not only India, that relies on its naval force as an element of its se-
curity would be threatened and thus prompted to seek either additional or more
capable systems or expand its operational plans to target this potent neutralizer
of its surface combatants.
Obscurants have the potential to reduce the strategic impact in both of these
cases. The overall strategic and operational value of Zulfiquar for Pakistan is
lessened, and the potential “game changing” nature of an ASBM is reduced.
There is a latent danger here. Obscurant systems must be effective enough, ei-
ther alone or in concert with other systems, to neutralize a sufficient number of
incoming missiles in the aggregate to make it obvious to a potential opponent
that increasing missile stockpiles would not result in a tactical advantage. Mar-
ginally effective obscurant systems could have the reverse effect of encouraging
an arms race, by prompting opponents to field large numbers of missiles in the
hopes of overwhelming defenses—much as is the case now. The whole point of
obscurants is that they will defeat nearly all incoming warheads, no matter how
many missiles are launched, the “leakers” to be handled with other defensive
systems.
With regard to balancing and influence, obscurants can affect the way allies
operate with the U.S. fleet and how they configure their forces. An explicit goal
of the Navy’s “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” is fostering co-
operation with other maritime nations. While the initiative is aimed at the
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quotidian task of strengthening maritime security, the ultimate expression of
cooperation is a nation’s decision to join a coalition. That decision is ultimately a
political one, based on an assessment of benefits and risks. Among the consider-
ations is the ability to operate effectively in the anticipated tactical environment
without undue exposure to damage or destruction. In a heavily saturated
antiship-missile environment, allied ships would be more survivable operating
with obscurants, producing a corresponding reduction in risk and of the politi-
cal pressure that inevitably results when a unit is lost or destroyed. Moreover, the
strategic risk to a nation with a relatively small fleet, for which the loss of even
one ship can have significant impact, is reduced.
There may be the undesirable second-order effect of making nearly all
radar-guided missiles less effective—including rendering U.S. weapons impo-
tent—which raises two salient considerations. First, if employment of obscu-
rants reduces the effectiveness of offensive antiship missiles and influence of
countries selling offensive missiles, then the influence gained by the United
States through the sale of those missiles would be lessened as well. Second, and
more important, the employment of obscurants could substantially affect the
current reliance on, and efficacy of, precision radar-guided missiles at sea to a
point where a major reformation in the way naval forces are structured and op-
erated would occur. Here the operational and strategic advantage is accrued by
those countries agile enough to adapt to the changed environment.
DETERRENCE
A central tenet of international relations theory, as echoed by the Department of
Defense, is that “deterrence operations convince adversaries not to take actions
that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-
making.”11 Increasing the level of perceived risk increases the ability of one
player to deter another. Obscurants can raise the risk an opponent perceives in
two principal ways.
First, while obscurants in themselves may not deter, their use injects a high
degree of uncertainty and unpredictability that in turn increases risk. Any
antiaccess strategy predicated on sea denial through the threat or use of antiship
missiles must estimate the numbers of missiles needed and types of targets to be
engaged. By making it harder to predict the number of missiles required for a de-
sired effect, obscurant systems will increase the risk for that opponent and, con-
comitantly, deterrence. Conversely, obscurants that create a tactical situation
where an offensive antiship missile strike will nearly always fail produces a near
certainty that in itself deters.
Second, obscurant systems and other kinetic or electronic defenses increase
the number of missiles needed per target. If this increased expenditure of
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missiles significantly draws down an adversary’s missile inventory, at some point
this reduction will have strategic consequences. In regions where the relative
balance of forces between nations is close, adversaries who rapidly deplete their
offensive missile inventory and yet fail to achieve the strategic benefits they were
seeking will degrade their relative strategic positions, regardless of whether this
conflict was with intra- or extraregional opponents.
The uncertainties that obscurants inject into calculations of the chance of
success and into the strategic risks of aggressive operations can be significant.
And uncertainty can deter. However, there are two instances in which obscu-
rants may have a neutral or negative impact on deterrence. First, as obscurant
systems are relatively inexpensive and low-tech, they are likely to proliferate. If
both sides employ this capability, obscurants can reduce the effectiveness of all
offensive missile systems. In this case, the side that can accrue tactical or opera-
tional advantages by other means—for example, through weapons that do not
rely on millimeter-wave or infrared homing, or through stealth or maneuver-
ability—will likely be more difficult to deter. Here, the deterrent effect of obscu-
rants is neutral.
However, in an ad bellum (approach to war) scenario where one side’s opera-
tional plan relies heavily on precision antiship missiles launched from transporter-
erector-launchers on land, a large first strike without warning would be tempting, as
the relative advantages of a land-based antiaccess plan would evaporate once off-
shore naval forces started using obscurants, resulting in a negative impact on deter-
rence. However, if obscurants are deployed on warning or used preemptively, as a
nonprovocative means of defense, deterrence is in fact increased. This is where es-
calation control plays a role.
ESCALATION CONTROL
Should deterrence fail, the use of obscurants can contribute to controlling esca-
lation and expanding the strategic options available. This is most evident in the
transition from an ad bellum to an in bello situation. Once an adversary strikes a
target, especially a high-value unit such as an aircraft carrier or “big deck” am-
phibious ship, there is tangible pressure to respond by striking an opponent’s
countervalue or a counterforce target. While conventional escalation does not
neatly conform to the notions of “countervalue” and “counterforce” options as
commonly understood in connection with nuclear deterrence, the conventional
challenges associated with each of these types of responses are useful to explore.
First, against an adversary who launches missiles from mobile transporter-
erector-launchers ashore, the direct counterforce options are limited to strikes
on fixed radars and supporting infrastructures—strikes that, these targets being
ashore in an opponent’s homeland and possibly having multiple uses, would
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likely be viewed as significantly escalatory. That is fine if it is the desired effect;
however, it becomes problematic when the effect is to respond in kind, without
significant escalation. Finding other conventional counterforce options would
mean expanding the target set to other military assets, preferably naval targets,
such as ships at sea or deployed submarines, or airborne aircraft operating over
land or water. If these assets are unlocated or untargetable and the only other
counterforce targets are on land, the risk of escalation will increase.
Second, against an adversary who has successfully struck a high-value naval
unit, finding an equivalent countervalue target would be a problem. However,
there are two options. One would be to strike unrelated military targets that are
of equal value in the aggregate. But dispersed naval assets like small boats, sub-
marines, and surface ships would be challenging and time-consuming targets to
strike and might not really add up to the value of the high-value unit originally
attacked. Most nations view strikes against naval combatants as lower on the es-
calation ladder than strikes against homeland targets, even though naval vessels
are considered sovereign territory. Thus responding to a strike against a naval
unit offshore with collectively equivalent countervalue strikes to military targets
onshore would likely be perceived as escalation. In the extreme case, where no
military target or groups of targets of equal value exist, other national assets
would need to be considered, including space-based military or commercial sys-
tems or certain military-related civilian facilities. Again, in either case the con-
flict would escalate.
Consider, then, a case in the transition to war where an adversary launches a
first strike using missiles against high-value targets at sea but fails, due in large
part to the effective use of obscurants. In this situation, strategic space is created
that lessens the need for an in-kind response and expands the range of options.
The targeted side can use this opportunity to give an adversary time to recon-
sider the chances of success, having failed in a first strike. This creates the oppor-
tunity for de-escalation.
Once in bello, controlling escalation without the use of obscurants becomes
particularly challenging, for three reasons. First, countering incoming antiship
missiles primarily with defensive missiles and other kinetic systems will
eventually deplete the defenders’ magazines, encouraging the adversary not to
de-escalate but to sustain or even increase its efforts. Second, moving beyond
the ranges of shore-launched missiles plays, in effect, into the adversary’s
antiaccess strategy. While such withdrawal may be viewed as de-escalatory, it is
de-escalation through capitulation. Lastly, tactics that target subsystems that
support the entire missile “enterprise,” such as surrounding and distant infra-
structure, command-and-control nodes, or satellites, prior to a missile launch
(the so-called left-of-launch options)—are all intrinsically escalatory.
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However, when obscurants effectively counter missile strikes by simply deny-
ing the incoming weapons’ homing ability, causing them to miss, there is less re-
quirement to expend defensive missiles, no need to reposition outside of
offensive missile ranges, and reduced justification for escalatory “left of launch”
options.
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES
A full examination of how to bring obscurants to the fleet is beyond the scope of
this article. However, as with any new concept, there would be organizational,
cultural, and programmatic obstacles to overcome.
Organizationally, bringing any obscurant system to the fleet through a “pro-
gram of record” will require intense collaboration across multiple communities
and commands as integrating any new concept has always proved to be a chal-
lenge. Recently, the Chief of Naval Operations signed an instruction that codi-
fies how the U.S. Navy will generate and develop new concepts. Obscurants
appear ripe for examination under the process described in this document.12
Moreover, the U.S. Army’s experience with making obscurants safe for person-
nel and compatible with other fielded systems represents insights with encour-
aging potential for adaptation by the Navy.
Culturally, the Navy is oriented toward active defense. This can be seen his-
torically in destroying incoming B5N Kate torpedo planes with F4F-4 Wildcat
fighters and shipboard antiaircraft batteries off Midway in 1942, or in the con-
temporary practice of intercepting incoming ASCMs with the SM-2 and Mark
15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System in 2010. There have been many passive de-
fense systems—including electronic countermeasures, radar-spoofing chaff,
and electronic decoys—but the preference, as measured by program dollars, is
overwhelmingly in favor of active defense. There are several good reasons for
this preference, not the least of which is the value of a positive kill and the accu-
rate battle-damage assessment that allows.
But perhaps the most significant obstacle is programmatic. In the intense
competition for funds, programs live and die by the perceived salience and im-
mediacy of their necessity. At present, in the absence of pressing need for them,
there is scant chance that obscurants will receive the attention and funding
needed to make them operational. But this may be changing. With the increas-
ing recognition that key elements of conventional naval striking forces may soon
be held at greater risk, the recognition that obscurants could reduce this risk
may also increase, thereby prompting greater interest in developing a program
of record to bring obscurant systems to the fleet.
It is worth noting here that systems fielded to counter new threats are often
highly classified, known only to a limited number of planners and operators.
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Such systems clearly have their place, but they have no impact on deterrence or
influence. To deter, systems must be known, and to influence, they must be
transferable. Highly classified systems are neither.
However, even with these obstacles there are opportunities. In the near term,
obscurants can serve as a system of “last resort.” With modest compatibility and
impact testing and minimal adaptation to the maritime environment, existing
obscurants could be used as a balancer to the DF-21 threat. Cloaking major
combatants in obscurants at first warning, whatever the impact on other ship
and aircraft systems, would be justifiable given the grave strategic consequences
of losing a major combatant to an ASBM strike.
As obscurant systems are introduced and tactical procedures and operational
doctrines are developed, any potential adversary will have to respond, adjust,
and counter them. This represents a clear midterm opportunity, as keeping po-
tential adversaries “off balance” causes them to expend time and resources. A
critical element of achieving this “off-balancing” effect would be a thoughtful
strategic communication effort to highlight the operational and strategic impli-
cations of the obscurant system. Likewise, even committing a reasonable effort
to making obscurants operational and openly trumpeting their existence will
create uncertainty and induce a recalculation of risk. An example of this is the
“buzz” generated by the impending introduction of the DF-21. Though there
has been no at-sea, operational demonstration of this missile, so much uncer-
tainty has been created by the Chinese press, with a consequent dialogue by U.S.
navalists and arms experts, that concern over the “game changing” nature of this
missile is emerging. This public discourse extends even to the official military
television channel in China, where a discussion of the DF-21’s predicted
lethality includes an animated cartoon of the sinking of an aircraft car-
rier—complete with a hapless sailor and vexed commanding officer.13 This dis-
cussion targeted audiences on both sides of the Pacific. Notable is the absence of
any portrayal of passive defenses.
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for obscurants is in their long-term effect
on the evolving character of naval warfare. In a future operational concept
based on the speed, maneuverability, and stealth of small, numerous missile-
launching surface platforms, obscurants can add to the difficulty of striking
these platforms, contribute to uncertainty on the part of adversaries, and estab-
lish a “tipping point” in favor of U.S. forces. Fielding systems and formulating
tactical and operational doctrine today can lay the foundation for obscurant use
in the future.
While the obstacles are not trivial, the operational and strategic opportuni-
ties that obscurants represent merit increased attention and a greater effort to
explore all the ways in which they can be brought to the fleet. Obscurants will
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have come full circle from October 1944 when a twenty-first-century destroyer
captain gives the order to “make smoke.”
NOTE S
1. The indomitable Cdr. Ernest Evans famously
shouted the command “Make smoke!” as he
steered the destroyer USS Johnston toward
the approaching Imperial Japanese Fleet dur-
ing the battle of Leyte Gulf. USS Johnston
(DD557) Action Report, DD557/A 16-3, se-
rial 04, 14 November 1944, Subject: Action
Report—Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I.,
25 October 1944.
2. For the purposes of this article, the term “ob-
scurants” describes any material that blocks
any electromagnetic or visible-spectrum
wavelength; “smoke” is meant to describe a
medium that suspends obscurant material in
the atmosphere.
3. U.S. Army Dept., Battlefield Obscuration,
Field Manual 3-11.50 (Washington, D.C.:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31
December 2008).
4. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “On
the Verge of a Game Changer,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (May 2009), pp. 26–32.
5. Using the Army’s Coyote system was pro-
posed and examined by Brett J. Morash, “Na-
val Obscuration” (research paper, U.S. Naval
War College, Warfare Analysis and Research
Department, Newport, R.I., 2006). Lieuten-
ant Commander Morash effectively described
the applicability and adaptability of the
M56E1 system for use in the naval
environment.
6. The figure of $2,560,000 was derived from
www.defenseindustrydaily.com/raytheons
-standard-missile-naval-defense-family
-updated-02919/, taking the total listed pro-
duction costs from fiscal years 2005–10
($915,100,000) and dividing by the total
number of missiles produced (357). This is a
conservative estimate, as it does not include
research, development, testing, and evalua-
tion, costs of which drive the total per-missile
cost closer to $6,000,000.
7. Qiu Zhenwei and Long Haiyan, “A Discus-
sion of China’s Development of an Antiship
Ballistic Missile (Combat Scenario),” Modern
Ships, quoted in “Ballistic Trajectory: China
Develops New Anti-ship Missile,” Jane’s,
www.janes.com/news/security/.
8. For instance, costs for the F-18 range between
$29 and $57 million per aircraft, depending
on variant. From U.S. Navy sources,
www.news.navy.mil/.
9. Stephen Blank, “China’s Rising Profile in In-
ternational Arms Sales,” China Brief 9, no. 25
(16 December 2009), pp. 10–12, www
.jamestown.org/.
10. Usman Ansari, “First Sword Class Frigate
Arrives in Pakistan,” Defense News (13
September 2009), available at www
.defensenews.com/.
11. U.S. Defense Dept., Deterrence Operations
Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Strategic Command,
December 2006), p. 3, available at www.dtic
.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20
.doc.
12. Chief of Naval Operations, “Navy Concept
Generation and Concept Development Pro-
gram,” OPNAVINST 5401.9, Washington,
D.C., 24 February 2010.
13. This video can be viewed at www.youtube
.com/watch?v=R-nNVvtacXU&feature=
related.
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